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THE DIGNITY OF EQUALITY LEGISLATION
OLATUNDE C. A. JOHNSON*
INTRODUCTION
In Congressional Power to Effect Sex Equality, Patricia Seith argues
that legal and social science commentary on the ratification failure of the
Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA") does not properly account for the legis-
lative gains achieved by the Economic Equity Act ("Equity Act").' In draw-
ing attention to the Equity Act, Seith's account challenges common
explanations of the source of women's equality gains, particularly the narra-
tives offered by legal commentators who typically focus on the role of the
Constitution and the courts.' As Seith points out, the conventional account in
legal history focuses on the effectuation of a "de facto ERA," a series of
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, which
some claim achieved much of what was sought by the ERA.' Without dimin-
ishing the gains of the "de facto ERA" or revisiting the failed ERA itself,
Seith's narrative shifts attention to the legislative gains achieved by the Eq-
uity Act.4
My aim in this response is to connect Seith's account to a broader dis-
cussion about the role of statutes and legislatures in advancing equity and to
locate the Equity Act in relation to other civil rights statutes. Seith offers at
least three important insights into the capacity of legislative lawmaking to
further equity goals. First, Seith's account shows how Congress can serve as
a key site for advancing constitutional norms. As I discuss below, Seith's
insight can be extended further to other civil rights contexts. Civil rights
statutes like the Equity Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 and the Fair
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. My title invokes Jeremy Waldron's de-
fense of legislative lawmaking, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION (1999). I am grateful to
Chade Severin for excellent research assistance. This response piece is one of three re-
sponses written in anticipation of a colloquium on the Economic Equity Act to be held at
Harvard Law School on February 21, 2013. The other responses can be read at
www.harvardjlg.com.
' See Patricia A. Seith, Congressional Power to Effect Sex Equality, 36 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 1 (2012).
2 Id. at 5-6.
3 See id. at 7 (citing CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER GAP: AN Eco-
NOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN (1990); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF
EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2003)) (noting that the conventional narrative understands the "de facto ERA"
as one of the key "linchpins of women's contemporary equality").41d.
5 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (prohibiting discrim-
ination in a range of public and private programs) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2010)).
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Housing Act of 19686 have the potential to advance a more capacious and
affirmative conception of equity than can be attained merely through a con-
stitutional lens.7 The equity norms advanced by these statutes are connected
in crucial respects to constitutional norms but are more expansive.
Second, Seith's account allows us to consider the limitations of the an-
tidiscrimination conception in advancing equity. Seith crucially notes that
the provisions of the Equity Act sought economic equity and substantive
equality, rather than "equality in theory."8 I show that the Equity Act is not
unique among civil rights statutes in moving beyond prohibitions of antidis-
crimination to advance equity. As I discuss below, other civil rights stat-
utes-both the paradigmatic civil rights statutes of the 1960s and a newer
wave of statutes-do more than prohibit discrimination; they adopt a
broader set of tools for advancing inclusion.9
Third, Seith reveals differences between the Equity Act and the typical
civil rights statute: the Equity Act does not centrally engage courts, and it is
not framed in the language of rights. Indeed, the Equity Act may be
marginalized in legal commentary for these reasons.'0 I argue that more gen-
erally, legal commentary should provide greater discussion of civil rights
statutes that do not depend on court enforcement. I point to statutory and
regulatory interventions that do not rely on private enforcement in courts,
but rather on implementation through legislative and administrative bodies."
Seith's account of the Equity Act should encourage legal commentators to
expand our conception of law to encompass the full range of legal interven-
tions in courts and in legislatures that seek to promote equality.
In this Article, I discuss these three key points, bringing in examples of
both longstanding civil rights statutes and some more recent enactments. The
majority of my examples come from efforts to address racial and ethnic
equality, but the models extend beyond these examples. Finally, I argue that
Seith's account of the Equity Act raises important questions for future explo-
ration by scholars of civil rights law. To best promote equity one must un-
derstand the relationship between various modes of societal change:
constitutionalism and legislative change; antidiscrimination and substantive
equality; and litigation and nonlitigation strategies. These explorations
should prove valuable not simply to academic commentators but also to
those seeking to effect change in society.
6 See Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2010)) (prohibiting discrimination related to housing).
7 See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing these statutes and provid-
ing additional examples).
8 Seith, supra note 1, at 7.
9 See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (providing examples of such statutes
at the federal and state levels).
'0 See Seith, supra note 1, at 5 (noting that the Equity Act "has gone virtually unno-
ticed in legal scholarship and is remarkably absent from contemporary sex equality
narratives").
" See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text (providing examples).
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LEGISLATING EQUITY
A. Why Civil Rights Statutes Are Superior
Seith casts the Equity Act as a realization, at least in part, of the consti-
tutional change sought by the ERA. 2 During the same session in which Con-
gress voted to adopt the ERA, supporters introduced the Women's Equality
Act-an earlier version of what would become the Equity Act. 3 Seith
frames the Equity Act as accomplishing many of the goals of the ERA's
enforcement clause, which would have given Congress the "power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation" the equality guarantees of the amend-
ment.' 4 Though the ERA was unrealized, through Seith's account one
imagines the Equity Act as a kind of de facto enforcement of the failed
amendment.' 5 With this lens Seith situates the Equity Act as an exercise of
"popular constitutionalism"-the notion that constitutional guarantees are
realized not only by judges and in courts, but also through the claims elected
officials and the public make on the Constitution. 6 In my view, however,
the Equity's Act chief lesson is not about the power of constitutionalism.
Though styled as an implementation of the Constitution, the Equity Act-
like other civil rights legislation-shows that legislation can embed a mean-
ing of equality that goes well beyond what the Constitution (at least as im-
plemented by courts) allows. In that sense, the Equity Act may be less an
instance of "popular constitutionalism" than an indication of the distinct
advantages of legislation.
In this vein, recent work by William Eskridge and John Ferejohn has
emphasized the extent to which we live in a "republic of statutes" in which
"normative commitments are announced and entrenched not through a pro-
cess of Constitutional amendment or Supreme Court pronouncements but
instead through the more gradual process of legislation, administrative im-
plementation, public feedback, and legislative reaffirmation and elabora-
tion.""7 Eskridge and Ferejohn laud the power of "superstatutes," statutes
that rival the Constitution in their capacity to shift society and entrench prin-
12 See Seith, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that the "ERA and the Women's Equality Act
were intended to go hand-in-hand").
" See id. at 12-13 (providing an overview of introduction of the Women's Equality
Act).
" See H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972); Seith, supra note 1, at 11-13
(describing the ERA).
15 Seith tells us that this was the conception often put forward by supporters of the
Act who, upon introducing the Act, cast it as "implementing legislation for the Equal
Rights Amendment." Seith, supra note 1 at 5, 22, 60 (quoting Rep. Geraldine Ferraro).16 See id. at 61 & nn.363-64 (citing Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the
Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 299 (2001),
who describes "popular constitutionalism").
17 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 14 (2010).
2013]
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender
ciples such as nondiscrimination.18 The Equity Act may not be a "supersta-
tute" on the level of the watershed Civil Rights Act of 1964-a central focus
of Eskridge and Ferejohn's account. As Seith points out, the legislative pro-
visions that constituted the Equity Act are not well known, and unlike the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equity Act was actually a set of discrete and
often small provisions enacted over a period of fifteen years.19 Even so, the
affirmative changes that the Equity Act made to social and economic laws
altered the state's role with regard to women and family status20 and pro-
moted women's citizenship and inclusion far beyond what the Constitution
(or any sought constitutional amendment) by its terms might require."
Constitutional provisions like the Equal Protection Clause make gener-
alized commitments to goals of equality. As is extensively discussed in legal
commentary, these generalized constitutional commitments are realized by
Supreme Court decisions but in narrow terms-advancing a minimalist no-
tion of equality in a Constitution generally averse to affirmative commit-
ments.22 Legislatures, however, are not limited to courts' minimalist view of
equality and can put forward a thicker notion of equality that responds to
specific barriers facing groups in our society. For instance, the Supreme
Court held in Geduldig v. Aiello that a state's failure to include pregnancy in
its disability program did not constitute intentional discrimination in viola-
tion of the Constitution's Equal Protection clause.23 Yet Congress enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act ("PDA") of 1978, creating a statutory prohi-
bition against pregnancy discrimination in employment. 24 Similarly, the Su-
preme Court has interpreted the Constitution to prohibit only actions
motivated by intentional discrimination, disallowing claims based solely on
a policy's or practice's disparate impact on a particular racial group or gen-
" See id. at 7 (introducing the notion of "superstatutes" and using the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as an example).
"9 See Seith, supra note 1, at 6 (suggesting that the Act was "[l]ikely overlooked
because of the Act's omnibus nature").
20 See id. (describing the Act as a "fifteen-year span of lawmaking activity in the
name of women's equality").
21 See id. at 3 (arguing that "even if the ERA had passed, its mandate, as borne out in
equal protection doctrine, could not have compelled the proactive revision to law and
reconstruction of the legal order that a substantive vision of sex equality ultimately
demands").
22 See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 17, at 40 (describing the Constitution as
generally aimed at securing the right of the individual to live free of government
intervention).
23 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974).
24The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)) (amending Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to
forbid sex discrimination on the basis of pregnancy). The PDA responded to the Supreme
Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert that Title VII's prohibition of discrimi-
nation "on the basis" of sex did not include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 429
U.S. 125, 136-38 (1976) (relying on the reasoning of Geduldig).
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der.21 In addition, the Court has set a high standard for proving that an action
is motivated by intent.26 And yet, the congressionally enacted Title VII-
affirmed by the Supreme Court 27 and expanded by Congress 28-permits liti-
gants to bring claims for racial and gender discrimination caused by unjusti-
fied disparate impacts. 29
More than expanding our conception of prohibited discrimination, leg-
islation can also require affirmative and proactive measures to promote
equality-a counter to our Constitution of essentially negative liberties. One
example is the Americans with Disabilities Act, which requires employers
and certain government actors not simply to refrain from discrimination, but
also to make reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities.30 A
less familiar example which I have highlighted in my recent work is Title
VIII of the Fair Housing Act. The Fair Housing Act ("FHA") prohibits dis-
crimination related to the provision of housing.31 But the FHA goes beyond
these prohibitions to place positive duties on government actors. Specifi-
cally, the FHA requires federal actors and recipients of federal funds to take
affirmative measures to promote fair housing in the operation of their pro-
grams and activities. 32 One virtue of legislation then, is that as long as the
25 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (holding in a case involving
claims of racial impact that "[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution").
26 See Pers. Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (requiring that to
prove intentional discrimination in a gender discrimination case, a decisionmaker must
have pursued a "particular course of action at least in part 'because of' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group").
27 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (finding that Title VII
prohibits employment practices with a discriminatory effect "unless they are demonstra-
bly a reasonable measure of job performance").
28 After the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing weakened the disparate
impact standard, Congress delineated the appropriate standard of proof in disparate im-
pact cases in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 3, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)) (referencing Wards
Cove Packing); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989) (holding
that "a comparison between the percentage of [unskilled] workers who are nonwhite and
the percentage of [skilled] workers who are nonwhite" does not make out a prima facie
case of disparate impact).
29 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2010) (specifying burden of proof in disparate impact
Title VII cases).
30 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 102, 104 Stat.
327, 331-32 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2010)) (including "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability" within the definition of "discrimination").
31 See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 73, 81 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2010)) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin" in the sale and rental of housing).
32 See id. at § 808 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §3608(e)(5) (2010)) (requiring
the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and executive departments and agen-
cies to administer their "programs and activities relating to housing and urban develop-
ment in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of [fair housing]"). For a
discussion of the "affirmatively furthering" requirement, see Olatunde C. A. Johnson,
Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1339, 1387-89 (2012) [hereinafter Equality Directives].
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Constitution provides Congress the general power to legislate in an area,33
Congress can go beyond the Constitution's narrow confines to place a more
expansive set of equality-promoting duties on government or private actors.
While the Constitution is difficult to amend, 34 legislative solutions can
respond flexibly to emerging and discrete barriers to inclusion and equity,
including gaps that arise in existing legislative remedies. For instance, over
the last several decades, states and localities have responded to a problem
not adequately addressed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968: the problem of
discrimination against housing applicants based on their source of income.35
A key source of rental income for housing recipients is housing voucher
programs like the federal Section 8 program, which allows applicants to rent
housing for a fixed percentage of their income (the local Public Housing
Authority pays the difference between 30 percent of the tenant's income and
the rent).36 Voucher programs serve as an important source of housing in-
come for poor families, and vouchers are also a crucial mechanism for pro-
moting racial and economic desegregation because, in theory, they allow
recipients to secure housing in low-poverty, integrated neighborhoods.
37
11 The powers necessary to the enactment of provisions of the Equity Act as well as
other civil rights statutes include Congress's power to spend and tax, its powers under the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper clauses, and its enforcement power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which have been interpreted to allow Congress to enact
"prophylactic legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct ...." Nev. Dep't
of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003).
3 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CON-
STITUTION GOES WRONG 21 (2006) (noting that the "U.S. Constitution is the most diffi-
cult to amend of any constitution existing in the world today") (citing Donald Lutz,
Toward a Formal Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFEC-
TION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 261 (Sanford
Levinson ed., 1995); ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 17, at 48 (characterizing the U.S.
Constitution as "old, short, and hard to amend").
31 The Fair Housing Act does not explicitly prohibit source-of-income discrimination.
See Kinara Flagg, Mending the Safety Net Through Source of Income Protections: The
Nexus Between Antidiscrimination and Social Welfare Law, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
201, 216 (2011) ("The FHA does not yet contain a prohibition on [source-of-income]
discrimination.").
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2010) (delineating purposes and procedures of low-income
housing assistance); 24 C.F.R. § 982.201(a)-(b) (2008) (providing income requirements
for Section 8 eligibility); Section 8 Rental Certificate Program, U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URB.
DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/Programdescription/cert8 (last visited
Dec. 4, 2012) (describing the contours of the Section 8 program and its eligibility
requirements).
31 See LANCE FREEMAN, THE IMPACT OF SOURCE OF INCOME LAWS ON VOUCHER
UTILIZATION AND LOCATIONAL OUTCOMES 1 (2011) (finding "a near consensus.., on the
superiority of vouchers over production subsidies as a means of meeting the nation's
affordable housing needs"), available at http://www.huduser.org/porta/publications/
pubasst/freeman-impact.html; Margery Austin Turner & Dolores Acevedo-Garcia, The
Benefits of Housing Mobility: A Review of the Research Evidence, in KEEPING THE PROM-
ISE: PRESERVING AND ENHANCING HOUSING MOBILITY IN THE SECTION 8 HOUSING
CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM, CONFERENCE REPORT OF THE THIRD NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE ON HOUSING MOBILITY 9, 9 (Philip Tegeler, Mary Cunningham, Margery Austin
Turner, eds., 2005) (noting emergence of federal policy that emphasizes housing mobility,
through the use of vouchers, to help low-income families "move from poor and predomi-
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When landlords refuse to take these vouchers, the project of promoting inte-
gration and increasing housing access is frustrated. As a response, thirteen
states and the District of Columbia now prohibit discrimination based on an
applicant's source of income.38
Even more recently, states have begun to respond to two employment
practices that may operate to unfairly limit opportunities for qualified work-
ers: employer inquiries into the criminal history of a job applicant and em-
ployer use of credit checks. Whether inquiring about criminal conviction
violates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not crystal clear; the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") (the agency charged with
implementing Title VII) has issued guidance noting that in some cases em-
ployer reliance on criminal history may violate Title VII and has recom-
mended a set of best practices for employers.3 9 Despite the ambiguity in
current Title VII law, several localities have recently adopted provisions lim-
iting inquiry into an individual's criminal history for public employment pro-
grams and deferring background checks until later in the hiring process.40 A
number of cities and counties have adopted similar restrictions for private
employers and government contractors. 41 Similarly, many states and locali-
ties have sought to end the employer practice of conducting credit checks on
new hires, a practice that opponents claim can operate to exclude qualified
applicants, limit employment of those suffering financial setbacks, invade
privacy, and have a disparate impact on minority groups.42 Here again,
nantly minority neighborhoods to more affluent and racially integrated communities."),
available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/KeepingPromise.pdf.
31 See POVERTY AND RACE RESOURCE ACTION COUNCIL, KEEPING THE PROMISE: PRE-
SERVING AND ENHANCING HOUSING MOBILITY IN THE SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE
VOUCHER PROGRAM app. B (2011), available at www.prrac.org/pdf/AppendixB.pdf (list-
ing thirteen states and more than thirty-five localities that ban source of income
discrimination).
39 See U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUI-
DANCE: CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECI-
SIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), available at www.
eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arrest conviction.cfm (finding that an "employer's use of an in-
dividual's criminal history in making employment decisions may, in some instances, vio-
late the prohibition against employment discrimination under Title VII" and
recommending "best practices for employers who are considering criminal record infor-
mation when making employment decisions").
40 See NAT'L EMP'T L. PROJ, BAN THE Box: MAJOR U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES
ADOPT FAIR HIRING POLICIES TO REMOVE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE
WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2012), available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/
CityandCountyHiringlnitiatives.pdf?nocdn = 1 (listing more than forty cities and counties
that have "banned the box").
" See id. at 30-31 (listing localities that have adopted restrictions on private employ-
ers or contractors).
42 See Ben Peck, Employment Credit Checks: The Case for Requiring Employers to
Use More Accurate and Fair Assessments, DEMOS, Nov. 5, 2012, http://www.demos.org/
publication/employment-credit-checks-case-requiring-employers-use-more-accurate-and-
fair-assessments (noting, additionally, that "[n]o evidence connects credit problems to
greater propensity to commit financial crimes on the job").
2013]
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whether the practice is forbidden by Title VII is unclear,43 and Congress has
yet to adopt legislation banning the practice.44 Yet several states have
adopted legislation to restrict the use of credit reports in employment.4 1
By allowing innovation to address emergent problems, and in placing
affirmative duties on government actors, civil rights statutes may in many
respects be "superior" to the Constitution. Yet one need not claim that seek-
ing constitutional change-what reformers sought in pursuing the ERA-is
an unnecessary strategy. 46 While a full discussion of the relative virtues of
constitutional law and legislation is beyond the scope of this piece, there is
no doubt a complex relationship between constitutional and statutory
change. As Eskridge and Ferejohn have noted, the Supreme Court's interpre-
tations of the Constitution can help "jump-start the political process,"
prompting political actors to regulate to promote constitutional goals. 47 The
1964 Civil Rights Act, for instance, implemented much of the constitutional
vision ushered in by Brown v. Board of Education.48 Certain provisions-
most notably Title VI of the Act, which forbids discrimination by entities
that receive federal government funds49-were enacted specifically to ad-
dress the constraints of the courts in implementing school desegregation
orders. 50
This interaction between constitutional and statutory change suggests
that even the "failed" ERA likely contributed to the passage of the provi-
sions that constituted the Equity Act. The mobilization effort-the motivated
legislators and the informed and active public constituency 5-that produced
the ERA no doubt helped sustain the multi-year process needed to put the
Equity Act in place. Seith tells us that the Equity Act tied together multiple
41 See Prohibited Practices: Pre-Employment Inquiries and Credit Rating or Eco-
nomic Status, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, www.eeoc.govlaws/practices/
inquiriesscredit.cfm (providing that "[i]nquiry into an applicant's current or past assets,
liabilities, or credit rating ... generally should be avoided because they tend to impact
more adversely on minorities and females" but noting that "[e]xceptions exist if the
employer can show that such information is essential to the particular job in question.").
44 See The Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 321, 112th Cong. (2011).
41 See Amy Traub, Ending Unjust Employment Credit Checks, DEMOS, Feb. 7, 2012,
http://www.demos.org/publication/ending-unjust-employment-credit-checks (reporting
that seven states-Washington, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, California, Maryland, and
Oregon-have passed laws prohibiting credit checks in employment).
I As to the failure of some Equity Act proposals, Seith notes that "[It is impossible
to know whether the Equity Act as a whole would have been more successful if the ERA
had passed." Seith, supra note 1, at 66.47 ESKRIDGE & FEREJOIN, supra note 17, at 54.
48 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2010)) (prohibiting discrimination based on race, color,
or national origin in any "program or activity" receiving "[federal financial
assistance").
5
o See STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CiviL RIGHTS ACT 5 (1995) (explaining that Title VI was a re-
sponse to the failure of states and localities to comply with court desegregation orders).
"1 See Seith, supra note 1, at 64-69 (describing lawmaking process that led to the
adoption of provisions of the Equity Act and the role of constituents).
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pieces of legislation. This involved many different committees and subcom-
mittees of Congress and required amendments to multiple provisions of the
United States Code-a legislative effort that entailed concerted effort by
legislators and stakeholders over a substantial period of time. 2 One might
imagine that the rights consciousness and the actual organizing infrastructure
gained from the effort to ratify the ERA helped propel and maintain organiz-
ing efforts.
In the end, my argument is that even as we recognize the existence of a
dialogic relationship between constitutional and legislative change, legisla-
tive strategies should be seen as coequal, rather than second-best, routes to
equality. Notions of equality will remain thin if only realized in the constitu-
tional context. Seith's account of the Equity Act thus contributes to recent
scholarship which urges legal commentators interested in expanding equity
and other inclusionary norms to pay heed to statutes and regulations and
abandon their predominant focus on constitutionalism. 3
B. From Antidiscrimination to Equity
A second important point that emerges from Seith's account is the in-
sufficiency of the antidiscrimination route to equity. The standard concep-
tion of civil rights legislation is that it promotes equity by advancing a
nondiscrimination goal. For instance, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
discrimination on the basis of race and other categories in public accommo-
dations, federally funded programs, and the employment sector.54 Similarly,
the Equal Pay Act of 1963 prohibits sex-based wage discrimination. The
core provisions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race, gender, and other categories in housing. 6 However, the
provisions of the Equity Act do not promote equity in this typical sense of
nondiscrimination. Rather, the Equity Act sought to reform social insurance,
employment, inheritance, pay, leave, and other laws that constrained wo-
men's economic status.57
52 See id. at Table 2 (listing major provisions of the Equity Act introduced from the
97th through the 104th Congresses).
53 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 17, at 10 (arguing that it is "the
republic of statutes, implemented by agencies and not the Constitution, implemented by
judges, that carries out this deepest role of government"); Johnson, Equality Directives,
supra note 32, at 1374-75 (showing how statutes and their implementing regulations go
beyond the constraints of constitutional law in advancing inclusion).
14 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (2010)).
" Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56, 56-57 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)).56 See, e.g., Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 73, 83
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2010)) (prohibiting, inter alia, discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing).
17 See Seith, supra note 1, at 24-25 (detailing how the Equity Act was targeted at the
multiple economic barriers federal laws and programs placed on women).
2013]
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Seith frames this distinction between standard civil rights laws and the
Equity Act as one of "equality in theory" versus "equality in fact."58 But
this distinction seems to only partially capture the difference between the
approaches. The nondiscrimination provisions of civil rights statutes also
aimed to achieve equal results, or "equality in fact." For example, Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act sought to remedy "the plight of the Negro in
our economy"5 9 and "open employment opportunities for Negroes in occu-
pations which have been traditionally closed to them."6 The Fair Housing
Act of 1968 prohibits discrimination with the aim of eliminating ghettos and
promoting integration. 61 In addition, the prohibitions against discrimination
in our classic civil rights statutes have arguably contributed to equality of
results through lawsuits and aggressive administrative enforcement. After
the passage of Title VII, for instance, the EEOC interpreted the statute's
broad language to prohibit discriminatory effects and pursued a strategy of
targeted enforcement of Title VII to open up particular industries to black
workers.62 Researchers have associated federal enforcement of antidis-
crimination law, including Title VII, with improvements in black socio-eco-
nomic status. 63
If the Equity Act seems to differ from these other civil rights statutes, it
is that the Act implicitly recognizes the limitations of the antidiscrimination
approach in achieving equal results. A similar move away from antidis-
crimination policies towards broader social policy interventions occurred
with regard to race. In the late 1960s, after the passage of major civil rights
statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
government actors and advocates promoted a new set of efforts to advance
the economic and social status of African Americans. These included affirm-
ative action in government contracting and efforts to battle poverty, fund
I ld. at 7.
59 110 CONG. REC. 6490 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey, a sponsor of the Act).
0 Id.
"I See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 3419 (1968) (statement of sponsor Sen. Mondale that
the goal of the Fair Housing Act was to promote "an integrated society, a stable society
free of the conditions which spawn riots, free of riots themselves"); 114 CONG. REC.
9527 (1968) (statement of Congressman Celler that the Fair Housing Act would eliminate
segregated housing and ghettos).
62 See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY 193-97, 244-47 (1990) (detailing the debate surrounding the
EEOC's use of data collection and reporting to identify and target sectors that underem-
ployed black workers); id. at 249-50 (describing how the EEOC, working with civil
fights attorneys, developed the "effects test" for Title VII).
63 See John Donohue HI & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change:
The Impact of Affirmative Action & Civil Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks,
29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1641 (1991) (suggesting that enforcement of federal civil
fights law, including Title VII, "was the major contributor to the sustained improvement
in black economic status that began in 1965"); id. at 1637-38 (noting that "much of the
black improvement in the decade following enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act came in the South" and detailing the role of federal Title VII enforcement
activity along with other federal efforts to combat discrimination and promote
integration).
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urban schools, and invest in urban areas. 64 President Lyndon B. Johnson, in
announcing efforts in 1965 to put affirmative action policies in place, fa-
mously noted the limitations of simply prohibiting discrimination. To ensure
more than "equality as a right and a theory, but equality as a fact and as a
result,' 65 Johnson argued, would require addressing the complex web of his-
torical and contemporary conditions that impeded social mobility for
blacks.6 6 President Johnson's statements implicitly challenged the liberal pre-
sumption that equality is possible without affirmative steps to redress past
harm and efforts to design new policies that are inclusive of previously ex-
cluded groups.
The move towards affirmative interventions is manifest in the Equity
Act, which directly addressed the limitations of New Deal programs in pro-
moting race and gender equity. As many accounts have shown, the New
Deal ushered in new responsibilities for the state in ensuring economic se-
curity for its citizens, but its purported universalism operated in key respects
to the disadvantage of women and African Americans. 67 New Deal programs
wrought this harm through explicit exclusions of African Americans and
women and by failing to take affirmative steps to remedy existing patterns of
inequality. 68 Against this backdrop an antidiscrimination remedy is necessa-
rily limited; the state's failure to affirmatively attend to inequality risks deep-
ening inequality.
The provisions of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 requiring the federal
government to promote housing integration and inclusion in the operation of
federal programs reflect this understanding of the limitations of the antidis-
crimination remedy. 69 Title VI and prior executive orders prohibited discrim-
ination in federally funded housing programs, but provisions of the Fair
Housing Act went further by placing affirmative requirements on federal
' See GRAHAM, supra note 62, at 456-57 (describing the shift away from antidis-
crimination enforcement towards affirmative action); U. S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
CIVIL RIGHTS: A NATIONAL, NOT A SPECIAL INTEREST 24-28 (June 25, 1981) [hereinaf-
ter CIVIL RIGHTS] (recounting how President Lyndon B. Johnson, recognizing the limita-
tions of civil rights law, convened in 1966 a White House Conference on Civil Rights
which urged federal efforts to address housing, school and poverty inequities in addition
to strengthening civil rights legislation).
6- President Lyndon B. Johnson, To Fulfill These Rights, Address at Howard Univer-
sity Commencement (June 4, 1965).
66 Id.67 See Seith, supra note 1, at 19-20; IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 43 (2005) (re-
counting Social Security's initial exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers and its
effect on blacks who disproportionately occupied that sector).68 See Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 154,
162-65 (2011) (revealing the capacity of federal spending programs to create "new
programmatic and funding structures that help sustain existing patterns of racial inequal-
ity" and showing how such mechanisms operated in federally funded housing and in-
come security programs).
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d); 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5).
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agencies and grantees. 70 Significantly, these provisions were put into place
because drafters recognized that Title VI was limited by failing to require
positive action. And drafters sought to engage the federal government in
remedying its past complicity in promoting housing segregation in New
Deal and post-New Deal programs. 71
Even as I underscore the limitations of the antidiscrimination paradigm,
it is worth probing the connections between antidiscrimination statutes and a
broader set of equity-promoting statutes-like the Equity Act-which seek
to directly change the very structure of social and economic programs. These
connections are manifest in at least two ways. First, antidiscrimination stat-
utes can pave the way for the inclusionary statutes that follow. In the race
context, a first wave of antidiscrimination statutes served as a crucial base
for securing more affirmative legislation. Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which forbids discrimination in federally funded programs, provides an
example. The enactment of Title VI was a critical step in the subsequent
enactment of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act ("ESEA"),
which provided federal funding for schools serving poor children.72 Specifi-
cally, some legislators opposed efforts to give federal funding to schools
until the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's provisions requiring
nondiscrimination in the use of federal funds.73 The transition from the 1964
Act to the 1965 ESEA also shows an evolution in the ambition of condi-
tioned federal funding. The nondiscrimination provisions of Title VI were a
tool crucial in encouraging school districts in the South to desegregate. 74 But
ESEA's model, adopted the subsequent year, placed affirmative require-
ments on federal funds, granting aid to poor schools to help them fund pro-
grams to address the educational problems faced by low-income,
disadvantaged children.75 The ESEA in turn paved the way for federal in-
volvement in promoting education reform through efforts such as the 2002
70 See Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 68, at 193 & n.192 (recounting
how civil rights advocates argued that Title VI and prior executive orders were insuffi-
cient in remedying housing discrimination and segregation).
71 See id. at 193-94 (detailing that "drafters of Title VIII sought to correct federal
responsibility for creating residential segregation patterns").72 See Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat.
27, 27 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq.) (announcing the Act's
purpose "to strengthen and improve educational quality and educational opportunities in
the Nation's elementary and secondary schools").
73 See STEPHEN K. BAILEY & EDITH K. MOSHER, ESEA: THE OFFICE OF EDUCATION
ADMINISTERS A LAW 31(1968) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 removed "the
race issue ... from the political calculus of those supporting or attacking increased Fed-
eral aid to education").
74 GARY ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 101 (1969)(finding that Title VI and its implementing guidelines "provided the standard operating
principles that were to enable a small group of men to desegregate, in four months time,
far more districts than the Federal courts had reached in 10 years").
15 See BAILEY & MOSHER, supra note 73, at 3 ("Title I of ESEA dictated the use of
massive Federal funds for the general purpose of upgrading the education of children who
were culturally and economically disadvantaged."); CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 64, at
52-58 (detailing legislative purpose of the ESEA to equalize educational opportunity and
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No Child Left Behind Act, which harnessed Title I funding to prompt states
to increase achievement of a range of groups including low-income students
and students of color.76 No Child Left Behind's emphasis on conditioned
spending as a tool for education reform in turn helped usher in President
Obama's 2009 "Race to the Top" program, a competitive grant program to
encourage states to engage in educational reform in specific areas."
Second, the antidiscrimination rubric-and its accompanying notions
of rights and fairness-has powerful rhetorical force. Notably, organizers of
the Equity Act harnessed the rhetoric of "equality" even though the Act's
provisions moved beyond constitutional conceptions of equality.7" Similarly,
when Lyndon B. Johnson spoke of the need to secure meaningful opportu-
nity for blacks in 1965, he spoke of the goal of fulfilling "rights."79 Even as
advocates sought to move beyond "rights" in the constitutional sense, these
invocations of "equality" and "rights" point to the political and cultural
salience of rights discourse. Accordingly, today's advocates interested in no-
tions of equity that extend beyond antidiscrimination would do well to de-
velop a language and framing of equality-related goals that has as much
resonance and weight as the language of antidiscrimination and rights. Some
commentators advance "citizenship" as a key organizing frame. 0 Susan
Strum in particular has argued for replacing the antidiscrimination frame-
diminish the underachievement of low-income children who were disproportionately
minority).
76 See Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C). No Child Left Behind reauthorized Title I of the ESEA and required states
to improve student achievement as measured by particular assessments. See id. at
§ 1001(3) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301) (describing Act's goal of "closing the achieve-
ment gap between high- and low-performing students, especially the achievement gaps
between minority and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and
their more advantaged peers").
17 "Race to the Top" is a program established initially as part of the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (279-86)
(ARRA, commonly known as the Recovery Act). States must adopt innovative programs
and show reforms in "increasing teacher effectiveness and addressing inequities in the
distribution of highly qualified teachers; establishing and using a system to track student
progress; making progress toward establishing college- and career-ready standards and
high quality assessments, and supporting interventions for improving and restructuring
failing schools." Johnson, supra note 68, at 178; see also ARRA § 14006, 123 Stat. at
283-84; U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE ToP PROGRAM EXEcUTIVE SUMMARY (2009),
available at www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
78 See, e.g., Seith, supra note 1, at 34 (recounting that legislators cast the Economic
Equity Act as "critical if we wish[ed] to guarantee equal rights for women under the
U.S. Constitution" and as the "instrument by which we will write the next chapter of
equality").
19 Johnson, supra note 65.
80 See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in
Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 249-50 (2006) (arguing that "institu-
tional citizenship" rather than diversity or antidiscrimination should serve as the frame-
work for promoting workplace equity); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race,
Stigma and Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 844 (2004) (locating racial harm
as harm to "citizenship"-"participation in one's community and government
processes").
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work with "institutional citizenship" which emphasizes normative goals of
structural inclusion, participation, and "creating the conditions enabling peo-
ple of all races and genders to realize their capabilit[ies] as they understand
them."'8' I have offered a similar conception, arguing that the prohibition of
bias is too narrow a goal for equity law and policy.82 Instead, I suggest that
the goals of equity policy should include prohibitions on bias, sharing of
public funds, promotion of integration, and furthering inclusion in poli-
cymaking and programs. With the goals thus broadened, the language of
"full citizenship" and "inclusion" might prove the best candidates for sup-
planting, or at minimum supplementing, the traditional concept of
antidiscrimination.
C. Implementing Equity
A third point emerges from Seith's account-one which distinguishes
the Equity Act from the standard civil rights statute. The Equity Act consti-
tuted a set of direct, legislative changes, rather than creating a cause of ac-
tion for litigants in court or an enforcement regime for federal agencies. The
prototypical civil rights statute prohibits discrimination and allows either
private enforcement by litigants or public enforcement by administrative
agencies. This is the essential model of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: its
most storied provision, Title VII, permits private enforcement by individuals
after exhaustion of an administrative complaint process.83 As another exam-
ple, the Equal Pay Act of 1963 allows private enforcement in courts or by
the Department of Labor. 4 The decision to rely on private and public en-
forcement reflects legislative choices about how best to implement a statute's
goal.
As recent commentary tells us, the congressional choice most often
made in the civil rights context is private litigation-for instance, giving
litigants the right to sue under Title VII in order to achieve a workplace free
of discrimination.85 This form of regulation can be effective in achieving a
statute's goals. Litigation to enforce Title VII is credited with increased hir-
S, Sturm, supra note 80, at 250 (introducing the notion of "institutional citizenship as
a justification and goal for diversity initiatives").
12 Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, supra note 68, at 202-03 (discussing notions
of citizenship and inclusion in the context of federal spending programs).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2010) (granting individuals the right to bring suit
after exhausting claims with the EEOC).
"See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(c) (2010).
" See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3 (2010) (offering that Congress makes a legislative choice to rely
on private enforcement). Farhang's account is intended to explain how the private plain-
tiff-driven model became the dominant model for enforcement of federal regulation in the
U.S., particularly in the civil rights context, and to argue that this form of enforcement
constitutes a species of state regulation. See id. at 10-13 (introducing "private statutory
enforcement litigation as an important form of state capacity" crucial to understanding
"the reach and strength of the American regulatory state").
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ing and promotion of women and racial minorities. 6 And there is evidence
to suggest that the threat of litigation leads firms and government organiza-
tions to adopt policies that promote employment of women and racial
minorities.87
Whatever the benefits of a private litigation regime, the Equity Act reg-
ulates equity differently-by changing the institutional structures that pro-
duce and reproduce inequality. The provisions of the Equity Act do not
provide a private right of action for court enforcement, damages, or any
remedial scheme. Yet Seith's account allows us to understand these provi-
sions as part of a regime for implementing equity-one no less important
than our statutes that implement social change through private litigation.
I am sympathetic to any effort to draw scholarly and advocacy attention
to equity-promoting statutes that do not require litigation. In earlier work, I
have advocated for a more expansive notion of civil rights that includes stat-
utes, often overlooked, that do not depend on private litigation.88 For in-
stance, I have written about a statute in the juvenile justice context, known
as the Disproportionate Minority Contact ("DMC") statute, which requires
states receiving juvenile justice funds to take steps to reduce disparities in
the rates at which minorities come into contact with the juvenile justice sys-
tem. 9 The statute creates incentives for the juvenile justice system to address
racial disparities, promotes federal oversight and technical assistance, and
engages private and public stakeholders in devising solutions and best prac-
tices. 90 More recently, similar approaches to curb minority overrepresenta-
tion in the criminal justice system have been launched at the state level.
Several states have adopted legislation requiring state legislatures or agen-
86 See Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private
Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 LAW &
Soc. INQUIRY 855, 883 (2006) (exploring the effect of affirmative action compliance
reviews and discrimination lawsuits on the entrance of women and minorities into man-
agement positions between 1971 and 2002 and finding that "[b]oth lawsuits and compli-
ance reviews had significant positive effects on the subsequent share of white women,
black women and black men in management").
87 See FARHANG, supra note 85, at 204 (reporting earlier findings that "independent
of the effects of actually being sued, the rate of job discrimination litigation in the geo-
graphic areas in which organizations do business is a significant factor driving their adop-
tion of policies calculated to increase employment opportunities for women and racial
minorities").
88 See Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 378-79
(2007) (discussing federal juvenile justice statute that conditions federal funds on states
taking steps to address racial disparities in the juvenile justice system); Johnson, Equality
Directives, supra note 32, at 1343 (arguing that American civil rights law operates not
simply through the private attorney general, but through statutes that "plac[e] positive
duties on state actors to promote equality and inclusion").
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(22) (2010). For an account of the history of the statute
and how it functions, see Johnson, Disparity Rules, supra note 88, at 407-10.
90 See Johnson, Disparity Rules, supra note 88 at 409-16 (describing statute's goals
and requirements).
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cies to evaluate the racial impact of pending legislation or sentencing mea-
sures and consider race-neutral alternatives. 91
Much like Seith's account of the Equity Act, these statutes reveal that
United States law contains a range of approaches beyond private enforce-
ment for implementing and promoting equity. Legal commentators will ben-
efit from paying attention to these multiple regimes. Acknowledging these
multiple regimes allows for a more complete descriptive account of the legal
mechanisms that promote equity and ensures that legal and policy stakehold-
ers use a full set of tools to advance important inclusionary goals.
CONCLUSION
In sum, Seith contributes to recent scholarly accounts of the capacity of
legislation to promote gender, race, and other forms of equality. While
Seith's account is fundamentally a recovery of history, the profound norma-
tive and forward-looking implications are inescapable. The Constitution, an-
tidiscrimination law, and litigation cannot alone fulfill the goals of the equity
project. The men and women who drafted the Equity Act were fully aware of
the partial nature of those standard tools. The challenge for all of us, particu-
larly those seeking to promote equity, is to continue to develop legislation
that effectively responds to emerging equity problems, and to ensure that we
use a broad range of advocacy strategies, including legislative advocacy, to
achieve greater inclusion.
91 See, e.g., Substitute H.B. 5933, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2008),
(codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-24b (West 2012) (effective June 5, 2008)), avail-
able at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/ACT/PA/2008PA-00143-ROOHB-05933-PA.htm (re-
quiring racial impact assessments of proposed legislation concerning criminal justice and
sentencing).
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